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Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative:
National Standards Governing
a Binational Resource
A Call for International Rulemaking
SEAN P. GALLAGHER*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Agreement) has been in
force for over two decades. The Agreement is a unique arrangement
between the United States and Canada for the management of a binational
resource as a complete ecosystem. During this time, concerns have been
raised that the United States is not committed to full implementation of the
Agreement.'
This Note will answer whether the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), when promulgating the Great Lakes Water
Quality Initiative, honored the binational ecosystem approach articulated in
the Agreement.
Although the EPA's rulemaking process for the Great Lakes Water
Quality Initiative (GLWQI) was impressive, numerous shortfalls exist.
Particularly, neither the International Joint Commission (IJC) nor Canada
was involved in the decision-making process. The absence of these two
parties produced three distinct defects in the decision-making process: (1)
the decisions of the EPA were not entirely consistent with the specific
mandate of the Agreement; (2) the United States did not honor the
binational approach to the management of the Great Lakes; and (3) the EPA
did not attempt to manage the Great Lakes as an ecosystem.
In order to remedy these defects, this Note proposes that the EPA
include both the IJC and the Canadian government in any decisionmaking

* J.D./M.S.E.S. Candidate, 1996, Indiana University, Bloomington; B.S. with Honor, 1992,
Michigan State University.
I. See Implementation of the United States/Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigationand Oversightof the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) (statement of Tim Elder, Field Coordinator, Great Lakes
United) [hereinafter Implementation Hearing].
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concerning the Great Lakes. This would set the course for true binational
management of the Great Lakes. However, this would also result in
inefficiencies. As a result, Congress should use its delegation power to
establish international rulemaking power in the IJC.
True binational cooperation can only be achieved when the
protectionism of national rulemaking is abandoned. The Great Lakes, as one
of the world's greatest natural resources, compel an ecosystem approach to
management. For an ecosystem approach to be successful, political
boundaries must be set aside and the interests of everyone involved must be
considered.
This Note proposes that Congress delegate rule-making
authority pursuant to the Agreement to the IJC. It is only through
internationalrulemaking that a true binational ecosystem approach can be
attained.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the Creation of the
InternationalJoint Commission
In 1909, the United States and Great Britain entered into the Boundary
Waters Treaty.2 The basic purpose was to protect the Great Lakes against
unilateral diversions and to secure the right of navigation.3 Significantly,
the IJC was created in article VII of the Treaty.4 The IJC is composed of
six representatives, three from the United States and three from Canada.5
The U.S. representatives are appointed by the President, while the Canadian
representatives are appointed by the Canadian government. 6 The IJC
purportedly functions as a "single body seeking common solutions to the
joint interests of the two countries. All Commissioners are expected to act
independently of their respective national concerns."7

2. Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. il,1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548
[hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
3. Edith Brown Weiss, New Direction for the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: A
Commentary, 65 CHI-KENT L. REv. 375, 377 (1989).
4. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2451, T.S. No. 548, at 5.
5. Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System and Correction, 58 Fed. Reg. 20,802,
20,819 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122) (proposed Apr. 16, 1993) [hereinafter Proposed
Rules].
6. Id.
7. Id.
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As articulated within the Boundary Waters Treaty, the IJC has three
primary responsibilities: (1) to approve applications for the obstruction or
diversion of water that would affect the level or flow of the Great Lakes; (2)
to conduct studies of specific problems upon request from either government
(references); and (3) to arbitrate specific disputes that may arise between the
two governments.8
In 1964, both the United States and Canada requested that the IJC
conduct a study, pursuant to its reference power, concerning the pollution
problems of the lower Great Lakes.9 Six years later, the IJC issued the
Lower Great Lakes Pollution Reference, ° identifying phosphorus loading
as the principal cause of eutrophication in the Great Lakes."
Most
2
notably, the IJC's report declared Lake Erie a "dead lake.'
The
discoveries from the pollution reference prompted the IJC's recommendation
to establish an integrated system of phosphorous control between the United
States and Canada. 3 The IJC's direction "laid the foundation for the first
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement."' 4

8.

Id. at 20,819.

9. George Grancis, BinationalCooperationfor the Great Lakes Water Quality: A Framework
for the GroundwaterConnection, 65 CHI-KENT L. REv. 359, 361 (1989).
10. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM'N, POLLUTION OF LAKE ERIE, LAKE ONTARIO, AND THE
INTERNATIONAL SECTION OF THE ST. LAWRENCE RIVER 5 (1970).

II. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,817. Eutrophication is "the process by which a body
of water becomes either naturally or by pollution rich in dissolved nutrients... and often shallow with
a seasonal deficiency in dissolved oxygen." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 429 (9th
ed. 1989).
12. Oversight of U.S. Progress Under the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 (statement of Hon. Gordon K. Durnil, Chairman, United States Section,
International Joint Commission) [hereinafter Oversight of US. Progress].
13. See PHOSPHORUS MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES TASK FORCE, INT'L JOINT COMM'N,
PHOSPHORUS MANAGEMENT FOR THE GREAT LAKES 1 (1980).
14. Grancis, supra note 9, at 361.
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B. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
1. The 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
On April 15, 1972, the United States and Canadian governments entered
into the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1972 GLWQA). 5
The underlying expectation of the 1972 GLWQA was to provide binational
management of the Great Lakes, preventing further deterioration of the
waters. 6 The 1972 GLWQA's immediate concern was to reduce the
7
phosphorus levels in the lakes.
Article II of the 1972 GLWQA established "general objectives" for
Great Lakes Water Quality. 8 These are narrative statements that generally
describe the desired water quality standards. 9 In addition, article III
contains "specific objectives" for Great Lakes Water Quality.20 The
specific objectives incorporate both narrative and numerical standards for
individual pollutants.2
Under the Agreement, the IJC was assigned the power to "assist in the
implementation of this Agreement. "22 The IJC has the ability to exercise
any power granted to it under the Boundary Waters Treaty. In addition
to the IJC's role under the Boundary Waters Treaty, the IJC's
responsibilities include, but are not limited to: analyzing information
relating to water quality; evaluating the effectiveness of programs; giving
recommendations concerning water quality objectives, legislation, and other

i5. The treaty was signed by Prime Minister Trudeau and President Nixon in Ottawa, Canada.
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972, Apr. 15, 1972, U.S.-Can., 23 U.S.T. 301,323 [hereinafter
1972 GLWQA].
16. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,818.
17. Id. Phosphorus and other "nutrients" are a principal ingredient in municipal sewage effluent.
Id.
18. 1972 GLWQA, supra note 15, art. II, 23 U.S.T. at 304.
19. For example, waters of the Great Lakes System should be "[flree from floating debris, oil,
scum and other floating materials entering the water as a result of human activity in amounts sufficient
to be unsightly or deleterious." Id.
20. Id. The specific objectives are set forth in annex I of the agreement. Id. annex 1, 23 U.S.T.
at 324.
21. An example of a narrative standard is "phenols and other objectionable taste and odour
producing substances should be substantially absent." Id. annex 1, 23 U.S.T. at 324. An example of a
numerical standard is, "[I]evels [of iron] should not exceed 0.3 milligrams per litre." Id.
22. Id. art. VI, § I, 23 U.S.T. at 308.

23.

Id. art. V1, § 2, 23 U.S.T. at 309.
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regulatory standards; and assisting in the coordination of joint activities.24
Except for the coordination of joint activities, the aforementioned
responsibilities are consistent with the traditional "references" provided by
the Boundary Waters Treaty.25
The 1972 GLWQA established the Great Lakes Water Quality Board
(WQB) and the Research Advisory Board.26 The WQB, as the principal
advisor to the IJC, is responsible for supporting the IJC in the exercise of
its powers and obligations.27 The Research Advisory Board's duties
included reviewing research activities, providing the IJC with advice on
scientific matters, and facilitating cooperation and coordination of
research.2
2. The 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
In 1977, the United States and Canada began a comprehensive review
of the operation and effectiveness of the 1972 GLWQA.29 These
negotiations resulted in a significant restructuring of the 1972 GLWQA.
Even though the 1972 GLWQA proved to be very effective in the reduction
of nutrients entering the Great Lakes,3 ° the agreement underestimated the
extent of the toxic chemical problem. In the five years following the 1972
GLWQA, toxic chemicals escalated to the forefront of Great Lakes pollution
issues.
As a result of the increasing toxic chemical problem, the United States
and Canadian governments agreed to revise the 1972 GLWQA.3 The
purpose of the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1978 GLWQA)
was "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity

24.

Id. art. VI, § 1, 23 U.S.T. at 308.

25. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE U.S. & THE ROYAL SOC'Y OF CAN.,
THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING INSTRUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT (1985) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL].

26. 1972 GLWQA, supra note 15, art. VII, § 1,23 U.S.T. at 309. The Research Advisory Board
was eliminated in the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978 and a new Science Advisory Board
(SAB) was created. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, Nov. 27, 1978, U.S.-Can., art. VIII,
30 U.S.T. 1394 (superseded 1972 GLWQA) [hereinafter 1978 GLWQA].
27. 1972 GLWQA, supra note 15, art. VII, § 1, 23 U.S.T. at 310.
28. Id. Terms of Reference for the Establishment of a Research Advisory Board, § 2, 23 U.S.T.
at 346.
29. Id. art. IX, § 3, 23 U.S.T. at 311.
30. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,818.
31. See 1978 GLWQA, supra note 26, 30 U.S.T. at 1383.
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of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem."32 The 1978 GLWQA
shifted the focus from nutrients to toxic substances, calling for the "virtual
elimination of the discharge of persistent toxic chemicals."33
Article IV of the 1978 GLWQA established "specific objectives" for the
Great Lakes System.34 These specific objectives represent the minimum
levels of water quality desired in the Great Lakes.35 In addition, annex 10
established two lists, one involving hazardous substances known to have
toxic effects on aquatic and animal life,36 and the second consisting of
"potential[ly] hazardous polluting substances."37 Programs in both the
United States and Canada must be developed to minimize or eliminate the
release of such substances.38 The parties are required to consult "from time
to time for the purpose of revising the list of hazardous polluting substances
and of identifying harmful quantities of these substances."39
The second major change found in the 1978 GLWQA is the addition of
the term "Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem,"40 defined in article I as "the
interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including
man . . . .'14
This expansion to the 1972 GLWQA was a crucial
breakthrough in the binational management strategy. The parties recognized
that the "restoration and enhancement of the boundary waters can not be
achieved independently of other parts of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem
42
with which these waters interact.

32. Id. art. II, 30 U.S.T. at 1387.
33. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,818.
34. Article IV of the 1978 GLWQA replaced article Ill of the 1972 GLWQA. The specific
objectives are set forth in annex I. Annex I of the 1972 GLWQA was completely replaced by a revised
annex 1, which focused on toxic chemicals. See 1978 GLWQA, supra note 26, annex 1, 30 U.S.T. at

1415. An example of a specific standard is: "The concentration of total arsenic in an unfiltered water
sample should not exceed 50 micrograms per liter to protect raw waters for public water supplies." Id.
annex I, 30 U.S.T. at 1416.
35. Id. art. IV, § l(a), 30 U.S.T. at 1388. The goal of the 1978 GLWQA is the virtual
elimination of toxic chemical discharge into the Great Lakes. Therefore, the Specific Objectives relating
to toxic discharges, which set specific standards, are "interim objectives," in effect until the elimination
of such discharges can be accomplished.
36. This list is known as appendix I of the 1978 GLWQA. Id. annex 10, § l(a), 30 U.S.T. at
1435 (emphasis added).
37. Id. app. 2, 30 U.S.T. at 1442 (emphasis added).
38. Id. annex 10, § l(d), 30 U.S.T. at 1435.
39. Id. art. VI, § 1(j), 30 U.S.T. at 1392.
40. Id. art. 11, 30 U.S.T. at 1387.
41. Id. art. I, 30 U.S.T. at 1385.
42. Id. pmbl., 30 U.S.T. at 1384.
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3. 1987 ProtocolAmending the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement
The IJC, pursuant to the 1978 GLWQA, is mandated to make biennial
reports to the United States and Canadian governments concerning the
progress of the goals and objectives stated therein.43 Furthermore, the
governments of each country were required to conduct a comprehensive
review of the 1978 GLWQA following the third biennial report of the
Commission."
The third biennial report of the IJC was issued in 1986. 4s As a result,
the parties entered into a comprehensive review of the agreement.
Thereafter, the 1978 GLWQA was amended by protocol in 1987,46 with no
major changes to the basic structure.
Nonetheless, the 1987 Protocol created two additional programs. First,
the amendments required the implementation of Remedial Action Plans
(RAPs). 47 RAPs are programs designed to deal with "toxic hotspots that
require immediate attention. 4 8 Second, the Protocol introduced the
establishment of Lakewide Management Plans for all the Great Lakes.49
The Protocol continued to emphasize the ecosystem approach mandated by
the 1978 GLWQA by stating that "Remedial Action Plans and Lakewide
Management Plans shall embody a systematic and comprehensive ecosystem
50
approach to restoring and protecting beneficial uses.
More meaningful to this discussion, the 1987 Protocol redefined the
roles of the two countries.'
It shifted responsibility from the IJC to the

43.
annually).
44.

Id. art. VII, § 3, 30 U.S.T. at 1394 (under the 1972 GLWQA the IJC was required to report

45.

INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMM'N, THIRD BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE GREAT LAKES WATER

Id. art. X, § 3, 30 U.S.T. at 1396.

QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA AND THE
STATES AND PROVINCES OF THE GREAT LAKES BASIN (1986).

46. Protocol Amending the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 18, 1987, U.S.Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11,551, at 4 [hereinafter 1987 Protocol].
47. Id.
48. Daniel K. DeWitt, Note, Great Words Needed for the GreatLakes: Reasons to Rewrite the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IND. L.J. 299, 312 (1993).
49. Lake Michigan is entirely within the boundary of the United States and therefore the United
States has the sole responsibility for developing its Lakewide Management Plan. The United States and
Canada are jointly responsible for developing the plans for the other lakes. 1987 Protocol, supra note
46, art. VIII, T.I.A.S. No. 11,551, at 10 (amending annex 2 of the 1978 GLWQA).
50. Id. at 8.
51. See Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,818.
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parties to facilitate coordination of the 1978 GLWQA.5 2 The parties are
required to meet at least once every two years for the purpose of
establishing new or modifying the existing specific objectives.5 3 During
the creation or modification of the specific objectives, the parties are to "be
guided" by the list established in annex 10.4
C. The 1987 Water Quality Act and the 1990 CriticalPrograms Act
The Water Quality Act of 1987" amended the Clean Water Act.56
According to legislative history, the amendments were enacted to provide
a federal statutory requirement for the implementation of the 1978
GLWQA. 57 Specifically, section 118 pertains to the Great Lakes, the
purpose of which is "to achieve the goals embodied in the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement of 1978.""
In addition, the Water Quality Act permanently established the Great
Lakes National Program Office (GLNPO). 9 This office serves as the
liaison to Canadian members of the IJC and the Canadian counterpart to the
EPA. 6° Furthermore, the GLNPO must implement and carry out the
responsibilities of the United States under the 1978 GLWQA, as amended
by the 1987 Protocol. 6'
In 1990, the United States Congress passed, and former President Bush
signed into law,62 the Great Lakes Critical Programs Act (CPA), amending
section 118 of the Clean Water Act. 63 The CPA was enacted to codify the
52. Telephone Interview with Jim Giattina, Deputy Director, Great Lakes National Program
Office (Mar. 8, 1994) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
53. 1987 Protocol, supra note 46, art. VII, T.I.A.S. No. 11,511, at 5 (amending annex I of the
1978 GLWQA).
54. Id. Annex 10 contains lists of hazardous polluting substances.
55. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100.4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1268 (1988)).
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
57. H.R. REP. No. 704, 101st. Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4278,
4278.
58. Clean Water Act § 118(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1268 (1988).
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1268(b) (1988).
60. 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(1)(C) (1988).
61. 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(I)(A) (1988).
62. "Passage of this bill is an indication that the Congress shares my commitment to protecting
the environment and my desire to clean up and maintain these bodies of water that are important
recreationally and historically to the people of the United States and Canada." 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1849, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4286-1 (statement by President Bush).
63. Great Lakes Critical Programs Act, Pub. L. No. 101-596, 104 Stat. 3000 (codified as

1995]

GREAT LAKES WATER

ongoing efforts of the EPA regarding the creation of water quality
standards. 64 Congress's intent was "to incorporate general and specific
objectives of the Agreement into the programs for development and
implementation of water quality standards under the Federal Water Pollution
65
Control Act.
The CPA created programs to implement the RAPs and the Lakewide
Management Plans created by the 1987 Protocol.66 In addition, the CPA
required the Administrator of the EPA to publish proposed water quality
guidelines for the Great Lakes System.67 The CPA mandated that the
guidelines conform to the provisions of the 1978 GLWQA, as amended by
Protocol in 1987.68
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY
AGREEMENT

A. Organization and Structure
In 1971, the EPA established the Large Lakes Research Station at
Grosse Ile, Michigan. 69 This was the first official "program" aimed at the
Great Lakes. 70 During the mid 1970s, the major focus of Great Lakes
research was on eutrophication problems. The focus of the research shifted
in the late 1970s to formation of models analyzing PCBs, heavy metals, and
other toxic chemicals. 7' To coordinate U.S. activities pursuant to the
Agreement, GLNPO was established by the EPA in 1977.72 GLNPO is the

amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1268 (Supp. 1992)).
64. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,823. The Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative is further
discussed in part III.B. of this paper.
65. H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 57, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4282.
66. Id. at 9, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4282.
67. 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1992). As a result of this requirement, the EPA created
the Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative. The proposed rules were not published until April 16, 1993,
almost two years after the statutory deadline.
68. Id.
69. United States/Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,99th Cong.,
2d. Sess. 5 (1986) (statement of James W. Falco, Environmental Protection Agency) [hereinafter
Agreement Hearing].
70. Id.
71. Id. at 5-6.
72. Id. at 97 (statement of Lee M. Thomas, Administrator, United States Environmental
Protection Agency).
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focal point for coordinating EPA efforts with all other entities that are
working on Great Lakes issues.73
The U.S. Policy Committee is composed of a consortium of federal
agencies, states, and EPA Regions dedicated to implementing the
Agreement.7 4 The U.S. Policy Committee was responsible for developing
objectives and strategies for the GLNPO and overseeing the implementation
of the GLWQA.75
Prior to the 1987 Protocol, there was no official requirement that the
U.S. and Canadian governments organize meetings to coordinate the
implementation of the Agreement. The IJC's role was to facilitate
coordination between the parties. However, as part of the 1987 Protocol,
emphasis shifted to the individual countries. The 1987 Protocol stated that
"[t]he parties, in cooperation with State and Provincial governments, shall
meet twice a year to coordinate their respective work plans with regard to
the implementation of this Agreement and to evaluate progress made. 76
Additionally, the supplement to annex 1 requires the parties to meet a
minimum of twice a year to establish or modify "specific objectives"
pursuant to article IV of the 1978 GLWQA.7 7
As a result, in 1988 the United States and Canada established the
Binational Executive Committee (BEC) to fulfill the requirements of the
1978 GLWQA as amended by the 1987 Protocol. 78 The BEC operates
independently of the IJC, 79 and its purpose is to guide the implementation
of binational activities by establishing priorities and reviewing the progress
of the programs.80

73. Id.
74. Great Lakes Water Quality Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of
the House Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,101st. Cong., 2d. Sess. 12-13 (1990) (statement
of Valdas V. Adamkus, Regional Administrator, Region V, Environmental Protection Agency)
[hereinafter Water Quality Issues].
75. The U.S. Policy Committee has not convened for several years. Currently, there is a
proposal being considered at the EPA to create the Great Lakes Executive Council. This Council would
replace the U.S. Policy Committee. Its responsibilities would be similar to the U.S. Policy Committee;
however, it would consist of higher ranking governmental officials. Telephone Interview, supra note 52.
76. Revised Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, as amended by Protocol signed Nov.
18, 1987, consolidated by the International Joint Commission, (Sept. 1989), art. X, § 3, 18 [hereinafter
Revised 1978 GLWQA].
77. Id. supp. to annex 1,§ 2(a), at 29.
78. Telephone Interview, supra note 52.
79. Id. The BEC is co-chaired by the Regional Administrator of Region V, EPA, and the
Director General of Ontario, Environment Canada. Id.
80. Minutes from the Eighth Meeting of the Parties in Cooperation with State and Provincial
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The BEC created the Binational Operations Committee (BOC), which
has the responsibility to plan and coordinate programs that the BEC labels
as priorities.8 ' The BOC comprises various committees.82 One such
subgroup is the Binational Objectives Development Committee (BODC).83
The BODC was created to facilitate cooperation in establishing criteria
pursuant to article IV of the 1978 GLWQA.84
These organizations were created to foster a spirit of cooperation
between the United States and Canada. As a result, a framework was
established to facilitate interaction and teamwork. Decisions made by either
country concerning the Great Lakes run through this framework.
B. The Clean Water Act and the Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative
Prior to the GLWQI, the Great Lakes were subject to National Water
Criteria, which were applicable to all waters in the United States.85 Under
the Clean Water Act, the EPA publishes National Water Criteria and the
states are required to set standards that are consistent with such criteria.86
The EPA has the authority to reject state standards, and eventually
promulgate individual standards if such state standards are inadequate.87
In 1989, the EPA recognized the unique status of the Great Lakes. It
acknowledged that the "[i]mplementation of the Agreement has been
hindered by lack of consistent water quality criteria and guidance specific
for the Great Lakes Basin." 8 Using authority under section 304(a) of the
Clean Water Act, 89 the EPA decided to develop a "subchapter" to the

Governments Under the 1987 Protocol to the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (Nov. 19,
1991) (on file in EPA GLWQI Public Docket) [hereinafter Minutes].
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. The requirements of article IV are set out in annex I of the 1978 GLWQA, as amended by
the 1987 Protocol. 1978 GLWQA, supra note 26, 30 U.S.T. at 1415-20.
85. Oversight of EPA and the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22 (1989) (statement of Charles Sutfin, Director, Water Quality Division, EPA
Region V) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Water Quality Issues, supra note 74, at 13.
89. Section 304(a) requires the Administrator of the EPA to publish criteria for water quality that
accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge. Clean Water Act § 304(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (1988).
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National Criteria pertaining to the Great Lakes.90 Thus, the EPA began the
long process of developing the GLWQI. 9' The criteria for the Great Lakes
are formulated in the GLWQI. These standards will be used as a basis for
revising the state water quality standards during the next triennial review,
as required by section 303(c) of the Clean Water Act. 92
In 1990, Congress passed the Great Lakes Critical Programs Act. 93
The purpose of this act was to codify the ongoing efforts of the EPA in
developing the GLWQI.94
Congress essentially compelled the
establishment of criteria unique to the Great Lakes. 95 It was Congress's
clear intent that the GLWQI contain criteria consistent with the
Agreement. 96 Thus, the GLWQI's explicit purpose was to integrate the
requirements of the Clean Water Act and the 1978 GLWQA, as amended
by the 1987 Protocol.97
Directed by federal statute, the EPA continued the process of
establishing Great Lakes Water Quality Criteria. The EPA determined that
the numerical criteria developed under the GLWQI will be submitted to the
BODC as the U.S. "proposal" for specific objectives.98
C. Administrative Process Used to Develop the Great Lakes Water
Quality Initiative
The EPA prepared a discussion paper entitled Implementation of the
Clean Water Act in Support of the GreatLakes Water Quality Agreement,
which recognized the need to create the GLWQI. 99 A concept paper
created in June 1989 established three committees to conduct work under the
GLWQI.'0°
First, the Steering Committee was created to head the

90. Id.
91. See generally Proposed Rules, supra note S.
92. Each state shall hold hearings, at least every three years, "for the purpose of reviewing
applicable water quality standards and, as appropriate, modifying and adopting standards." Clean Water
Act § 303(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)(1) (1988).
93. This Act was passed one year after the process to develop the GLWQI began.
94. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,823.
95. Clean Water Act § 18(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(2) (Supp. 1992).
96. H.R. REP. No. 704, supra note 57, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4281.
97. Id.
98. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY INITIATIVE
SCOPE OF WORK 2 (June 29, 1990).
99. Id. at i.
100. Id. at 4.
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development process.' °' This committee consists of the Water Program
Directors for the eight Great Lakes states" 2 and representatives from
regional and national EPA offices. 3 The committee discussed and made
final determinations concerning scientific and policy-related issues."
Second, the Technical Work Group was established to prepare the
technical proposals that were submitted to the Steering Committee.'0 5 The
Technical Work Group consists of technical staff from the environmental
agencies of each of the Great Lake states, the EPA, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service."
The final committee created was the Public Participation Group
consisting of representatives from environmental groups, municipalities,
industry, and academia. 0 7 The responsibilities of the Public Participation
Group were advising the committees of the public's concerns and keeping
their various constituencies updated on the activities.'0 8
This system received numerous compliments for the continued
involvement of the states and interest groups throughout the process. Mark
Van Putten, a co-chair of the Public Participation Group states, "[iun my 15
years as an environmental activist, this is absolutely the fairest and the most
open government decision-making process in which I have ever
participated."'" However, despite this praise, the EPA included neither
the Canadian government nor the IJC in the process. The Great Lakes are
a binational resource, located on the U.S.-Canadian border; therefore there
should be binational cooperation. In addition, the IJC is the leading expert
on Great. Lakes issues, and is required by the 1978 GLWQA to assist in the
implementation of the agreement. Although the process seems fair and
honest from the point of view of those involved, it does not include
everyone affected by the decisions.

101. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,820.
102. The eight Great Lakes states are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
103. Proposed Rules, supra note 5, at 20,820.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Legal Pollution of the Great Lakes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
GovernmentManagement of the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 102d Cong., IstSess. 50 (1991)
(statement of Mark Van Putten, Co-chair Public Participation Group, Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative
and Director, Great Lakes Natural Resource Center, National Wildlife Federation).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEDURE UTILIZED BY THE ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY IN THE PROMULGATION OF THE GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT

A. The ProcedureFollowed by the EPA Resulted in Inconsistencies with
the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement
Disputes have occurred within the EPA and also between the EPA and
the Department of State as to the legal significance of the 1978 GLWQA,
as amended by Protocol in 1987."I0 However, as a result of the CPA,
Congress has mandated that the requirements of the Agreement are binding
as federal law."' Congress's intent when passing the CPA was to codify
the requirements of the 1978 GLWQA into federal law." 2 Additionally,
the CPA explicitly authorizes the EPA to promulgate guidance that is
consistent with the 1978 GLWQA, as amended by 1987 Protocol." 3
The proposed GLWQI would result in significant progress in the U.S.
efforts to implement the 1978 GLWQA. However, the proposed rules fall
short of the federal mandate requiring consistency with the Agreement in
several ways. First, no provision in the GLWQI requires the phasing out of
the use of persistent toxic chemicals.1 14 The GLWQA commands the
virtual elimination of toxic chemicals from the Great Lakes. 115
Specifically, "the philosophy adopted for control of inputs of persistent toxic

110. According to a Congressional Research Service report, under international law, specifically
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, agreements are considered binding as treaties. Agreement
Hearing, supra note 69, at 108 (statement of Hon. James L. Oberstar, Chairman Subcomm. on
Investigations and Oversight). However, many EPA officials, including former EPA General Counsel
Joan Bernstein, have concluded that the Agreement does not bind the EPA. Implementation Hearing,
supra note i, at 13 (statement of Mark Van Putten, Director, Great Lakes Natural Resources Center,
National Wildlife Federation).
111.See generally Implementation Hearing,supra note 1,at 12 (statement of Mark Van Putten,
Director, Great Lakes Natural Resources Center, National Wildlife Federation); Toxic Pollution in the
Great Lakes: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works
and Transportation, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 118-19 (1988) (statement of Carol Finch, Director, Great
Lakes National Program Office, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
112. H.R. REP. NO. 704, supra note 57, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4281.
113. Great Lakes Critical Programs Act, Pub. L. No. 101-596, 104 Stat. 3000 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1268 (Supp. 1992)).
114. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, A CITIZENS GUIDE TO THE GREAT LAKES WATER
QUALITY INITIATIVE at ii (Sept. 13, 1993).
115. Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, art. II, at 7.

1995]

GREAT LAKES WATER

substances shall be zero discharge.""' 6 The proposed EPA regulations are
not based upon a zero discharge theory; therefore, the rules will not
advance the goal of virtual elimination of toxic chemicals in the Great
Lakes." 7 As stated in the Agreement, the specific objectives for toxic
chemicals are merely interim objectives; the final goal is the virtual
elimination of toxic chemical discharge." 8
Second, although the GLWQI contains a list of "pollutants of initial
focus," 9 the list is incomplete because it omits pollutants that have
serious impacts on the Great Lakes ecosystem. 2 ° The 1978 GLWQA
contains a list of "hazardous polluting substances."'12' The parties to the
Agreement are required to "[d]evelop and implement programs and measures
to minimize or eliminate the risk of release of hazardous polluting
substances to the Great Lakes System."' 2 2 However, the EPA failed to
include in the GLWQI all the chemicals listed as hazardous polluting
substances specified in the 1978 GLWQA.22 This list of hazardous
in the development of the specific
polluting substances must be considered
24
Agreement.
the
under
objectives
Although the GLWQI takes great strides toward the implementation of
the 1978 GLWQA, it does not fully satisfy the objectives of the
Agreement. 25 Problems of implementation occur due to the protectionism
of the rulemaking process. Significantly, Canada was not involved in the
promulgation of rules, and was thus unable to protect its interests.
Additionally, the IJC, whose delegated responsibility is to assist in the
implementation of the 1978 GLWQA, was neither present nor consulted in
the determination of whether the proposed rules satisfied the requirements
of the Agreement.

116.

Id. annex 12, § 2(a)(ii), at 70.

117.

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 114, at 10.

118.
119.

Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, supp. to annex 1, § I(a), at 29.

120.

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 114, at 6.
Id.

121.
122.

Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, annex 10, § 1(a), at 56.
Id. annex 10, § 1(d), at 56.

123.

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 114, at 6.

124.
125.

See Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, annex 10, at 56.
NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 114, at 9.
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B. The Binational Strategy of CooperationMandated by the 1978
GL WQA Was Disregarded
Under the 1978 GLWQA, it is the IJC's responsibility to assist in the
implementation of the Agreement.' 26 As a result, the IJC has become the
leading expert in the area of ecosystem management of the Great Lakes.
The Commission is composed of members from both the Canadian and
United States governments, working together to meet the common goals of
the Agreement.
The IJC's duties include providing assistance in the coordination ofjoint
activities. 2 7 However, the IJC was not involved in the promulgation of
the GLWQI-it was overlooked. The IJC was not invited to attend
meetings, nor was it consulted when questions concerning the
implementation of the Agreement arose.' 28 The IJC was minimally
informed about the proposed rules and was not given an opportunity to
participate.
Additionally, the 1987 Protocol, which amended the 1978 GLWQA,
established explicit requirements for binational cooperation in the
implementation of the Agreement. 29 This cooperation includes the
development and revision of specific objectives mandated by article IV.' 30
The BODC was established to coordinate a binational approach to the
creation of specific water criteria.' 31 Although the BODC was informed
of the status of the process when the EPA proposed the GLWQI, it was not
consulted regarding the specific standards of the proposed rules.
The Canadian government expressed concern over the absence of
binational cooperation in the promulgation of the proposed rules. "[T]he
Canadian members of the BODC believe that the process outlined in the

126. Revised 1978 GLWQA,supra note 76, art. VII, § I, at 15.
127. Id. art. VII, § I(e), at 15.
128. Telephone Interview, supra note 52.
129. Article X, § 3 requires the parties to meet twice a year to coordinate their respective work
plans with regard to the implementation of the Agreement. Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, art.
X, § 3, at 18. Additionally, the supplement to annex I requires that the parties meet at least twice a year
to establish or modify specific objectives. Id. supp. to annex 1, § 2(a), at 29.
130. See id.
13 1. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GREAT LAKES COMMITTEES AND WORKGROUPS
SUPPORTING THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT (Aug. 3 1,
1989).
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Great Lakes Water Quality Initiative for the development of water quality
standards runs counter to the spirit of cooperation of the BODC."''
When the United States, through the EPA, develops criteria
independently of the Canadian government, the United States creates a risk
of inconsistency and incompatibility of the regulations. This fear was
expressed by a Canadian representative who said, "it is essential that
[Canada] be given time to evaluate and negotiate the criteria numbers being
developed by the initiative and that they take strong exception to anything
that places them in a position of being confronted by afait accompli from
33
the U.S. side."'
The rules promulgated by the EPA would eventually be submitted to the
BODC as the United States' proposal for specific objectives, but, is this
really a true proposal? Administratively, once the EPA completes the rulemaking process and establishes regulations, the likelihood of changes to the
regulations is nil. As the Canadians feared, this is a fait accompli by the
EPA.
The Canadian government was invited to participate in the GLWQI
process as an observer. 34 The EPA believed that "[p]articipation by
Canada in the GLI [sic] through observer status [would] facilitate data
sharing and input of Canadian expertise, [would] help Canada maintain full
knowledge of the process and information used in developing the Great
Lakes specific guidance, and [would] provide an opportunity for raising
differences of opinion should they develop."' 35 However, this forces the
Canadian government to compete with numerous U.S. companies and
environmental groups for a limited time to speak and present its views in
front of the Public Participation Group. 36 Although the Canadian
government was allowed to observe in the promulgation of the GLWQI, this
was nothing but an external expression of courtesy by the EPA. Canada had
no influence over the decision-making process, which runs counter to the
explicit requirements of the Agreement.
132. Letter from A.R. Davis, Water Quality Branch, Inland Waters Directorate, Ottawa, Ontario,
to W. Willford, Great Lakes National Program Office, Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 1, 1989)
(on file in EPA GLWQI Public Docket).
133. Minutes, supra note 80 (statement by Gerald Rees, Ontario Provincial Represenative).
134. Letter from Valdas V. Adamkus, Great Lakes National Program Manager, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, to David Egar, Regional Director General, Ontario Region,
Environment Canada (Nov. 28, 1989) (on file in EPA GLWQI Public Docket).
135. Id.
136. The Canadian Government declined the invitation to participate as an observer in the process.
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A Canadian official has expressed the need to involve the Canadian
government in the decision-making process. "We think that it would be
much more preferable for Canada and the United States to develop
objectives by working together at each step of the process rather than
negotiating the acceptance of modification of one or the other's product
which may have been derived differently."' 37 Not only did the EPA
ignore the mandate of the Agreement, but it also ignored the pleas of our
northern neighbor.
In order to fully achieve the goals pursuant to the Agreement, there must
be planning and coordination between all parties that influence the Great
Lakes Basin Ecosystem. The Agreement commands an ecosystem approach
to the management of the Great Lakes. "[W]e share the Lakes with our
neighbors to the North. The criteria should be consistent across boundaries
if we are going to achieve our goals.' 38 Therefore, the EPA failed to
fulfill its mandate for binational cooperation concerning such an important
binational resource.
C. The GLWQA Concept of Ecosystem Management Was Absent
The theory of an "ecosystem" has developed over many years. The
pioneering limnologist, E.A. Birge, was one of the first to put forward an
integrated view of a lake as a system: "a view of a lake, or of its plankton
community, as a unit whole, a water-cosmos, a complex, interlocking
network of physical, chemical and living process, yet subject to general laws
which should not be beyond the wit of man to discover."' l'
Much time
and effort has been spent by the United States and the Canadian
governments to discover the "general laws" about which E.A. Birge wrote.
This research has evolved into the concept of the Great Lakes Ecosystem.
[T]he Great Lakes system does not exist as a group of isolated
lakes. The slow-paced, but determined flow of the Upper to the
Lower Lakes means that the actions of one will someday impact

137. Letter from D. Egar, Regional Director Counsel, Environment Canada, to Valdas V.
Adamkus, Regional Administrator, Region V, Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 14, 1989) (on file
in the EPA GLWQI Public Docket).
138. Water Quality Issues, supra note 74, at 28 (statement of R. Darryl Banks, Deputy
Commissioner, New York State Department of Environmental Conservation).
139. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 28.
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upon its neighbor, and upon its neighbor, and so on throughout the
system. Our countries must understand that contamination does not
recognize international borders.14
The need for an ecosystem approach to management of the Great Lakes
was expressed in a report by the Research Advisory Board:
[t]he accent on water quality in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
and the accent on water quality objectives in the Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement have, in the absence of an ecosystem approach,
unduly constrained the parties and the Commission from attaining
the desired goal ....

Adoption of the ecosystem approach will

relieve these constraints, facilitating the restoration and enhancement
in perpetuity of the quality of boundary waters.'
This report launched the beginning of the development of the Great
Lakes Ecosystem Approach. The governments of the United States and
Canada, in the 1978 GLWQA, agreed to pursue an ecosystem management
policy for the Great Lakes.'42 This was the first international agreement
to "embrace the ecosystem approach to the management of large regional
resources."' 43 The purpose of the 1978 GLWQA was "to restore and
maintain the . . . integrity of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin

The purpose behind this policy was to cross political
Ecosystem."'"4
boundaries and work together across the entire ecosystem. The Great Lakes
cannot be treated as bordering only one shore. In order to effectively
manage such a large resource, the cooperation must be immense. This
ecosystem approach requires the governments of the United States and
Canada to work together to develop criteria and plans.
Only through this spirit of cooperation can a true ecosystem approach
be attained. Simultaneously viewing the Great Lakes from both shores will
result in management strategies that will complement each other,
management strategies that will take into consideration the differences of the

140. Water Quality Issues, supra note 74, at 6 (statement of Gordon K. Durnil, Chairman, U.S.
Section, International Joint Commission).
141. GREAT LAKES SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, THE ECOSYSTEM APPROACH at viii (1978).
142. See Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, art. II, at 7.
143. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 105.
144. Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, art. 11,at 7.
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entire ecosystem, and management strategies that will look to the benefit of
the whole and not just a single shoreline view.
Pollution does not recognize international borders. As a result,
contaminants released from the Canadian side of the lakes have a direct
impact on U.S. Great Lakes policy. In order to best formulate a
management strategy, analysis must be made of all contaminants being
released into the Great Lakes Basin. The negative effect of pollution in the
Great Lakes is a result of the cumulative effects of contaminants released by
both the United States and Canada. Therefore, in order to pursue an
ecosystem approach, both countries must be aware of the activities on the
other shore.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. The Environmental ProtectionAgency, in Future Rulemaking, Must
Allow the Canadian Government and the IJC an Opportunity to
Participatein the Decision-MakingProcess
Neither the IJC nor the Canadian government was involved in the
decision-making process of the promulgation of the proposed rules. As a
result, three major deficiencies occurred in the process: (1) failure to
achieve the specific requirements of the GLWQA; (2) failure to follow the
approach of binational cooperation; and (3) failure to manage the Great
Lakes as an ecosystem.
To correct these defects, the EPA should allow the Canadian
government and the IJC an opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process. Three actions are required in order to achieve this cooperation: (1)
the EPA must create a seat on the Steering Committee for an appointed
member of the IJC; (2) the EPA must create a seat on the Technical
Committee for a member of the IJC's Science Advisory Board; and (3) the
EPA Steering Committee must consult with the Canadian government before
making decisions.
It is the IJC's role to "assist" in implementing the 1978 GLWQA. a5
The IJC's responsibilities include analyzing the effectiveness of programs
and tendering advice and recommendations involving regulatory

145.

Id. art. VII, § 1, at 15.
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standards." It is impossible to fulfill these requirements when the IJC is
not involved in the decision-making process. It is well settled that the IJC
is the leading expert in the field of Great Lakes Ecosystem Management.
It has the necessary practical experience on how best to implement the 1978
GLWQA. This experience and expertise would be very beneficial to the
Steering Committee as it directs the development of the proposed rules.
In addition, the Science Advisory Board (SAB) is the scientific advisor
to the IJC. 147 The SAB's duties include advising jurisdictions of relevant
research needs and promoting coordination in the research and development
of scientific data. 148 The Technical Committee will benefit from the
SAB's knowledge and experience.
The members of these two seats would serve as ombudsmen for the
Great Lakes. These two members would represent the Agreement, and it
would be their job to point out possible violations of the Agreement that
may arise throughout the development of the proposed rules. 149 An
ombudsman would serve as "a signal to the Great Lakes communities that
the area must be treated as a basin-wide ecosystem and that the Agreement
will be enforced on a basin-wide basis." 50
Additionally, the Steering Committee should formally meet with a
Canadian assembly in order to discuss the rules before they are proposed.
The Great Lakes are a binational resource necessitating the involvement of
Canada in any decision regarding management of the resource. "If
consultation with foreign counterparts promises to yield information of use
to an agency in its policymaking functions, then that behavior legitimately
5
forms part of agency practice."' 1
The issues presented by the Great Lakes are analogous to the issues
confronting international air transportation, where the Second Circuit has
recognized the need to consult with foreign countries.'5 2 The court stated,
"there is an obvious need for cooperation, coordination and mutual
agreement regarding the regulation of scheduled and charter services among

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id. Terms of Reference, at 82.
Id. at 83.
See Weiss, supra note 3, at 384-85.
Id. at 385.

151. George A. Berman, Regulatory Cooperationwith CounterpartAgencies Abroad: The FAA's
Aircraft Certification Experience, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 669, 741 (1993).

152.

Pan American World Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 517 F.2d 734, 746 (2d. Cir. 1975).
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the countries in international air transportation,"' 53 recognizing the need
for cooperation to protect safety. Since the Great Lakes also have potential
health and safety effects on citizens of both Canada and the United States,
increased cooperation is a necessity. Each country has rules and regulations
affecting the management of the Great Lakes. Thus, no agency should "be
expected to insulate itself from knowledge of the policies and preferences
of foreign counterpart agencies."' 54
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not prevent an agency
from consulting with a foreign government.'55 However, concerns may
arise that if an agency reaches a decision or compromise with a foreign
agency, it would then be difficult for that agency to depart from such a
compromise. 5 6 This is a legitimate concern. Nevertheless, if an agency
operates in good faith, then such problems will not arise. In the current
situation, after the Steering Committee consults with its Canadian
counterpart, the rules still must be published in the Federal Register and
made subject to public comments. This is the necessary check to make sure
that the agency is still open to the opinions of private interest groups.
When the EPA consults with Canada, an additional issue may arise
concerning the procedure of the meetings. In order to address concerns
relating to an outside advisory group, Congress, in 1972, passed the Federal
Advisory Committee Act (FACA)' 57 The FACA requires that notice for
all advisory committee meetings be published in the Federal Register, and
that such meetings be open to the general public.'58 In addition, "the
records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts,
studies, agenda, or other documents" must be made available for public
inspection and copying.'
Consequently, the issue arises as to whether
these meetings must conform to the FACA.
The FACA defines an advisory committee as "any committee, board,
commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar group"
that was established for the purpose of rendering advice or

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 746.
Berman, supra note 151, at 743.
See generally id.
Id. at 770.
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1988).
Id.
Id. § 10(b).

1995]

GREAT LAKES WATER

recommendations. 60 Under this definition, it would appear as if the
Canadian delegation were operating as an advisory committee. However,
the Supreme Court limited the applicability of FACA in Public Citizen v.
US. Dep't of Justice.'6' The Court stated that FACA cannot be
interpreted "to cover every formal and informal consultation between the
President of an Executive agency and a group rendering advice."' 62 The
Court suggests that the FACA is applicable only to Advisory Committees
that were established by the agency for that specific purpose. 63 Under
this definition, the Canadian government is not an advisory committee.
The Steering Committee should provide for binational meetings in which
the Canadian government could give advice and recommendations prior to
the publication of the proposed rules. This would give the Canadian
government a chance to express its concerns and negotiate a compromise.
Thereafter, the proposed rule would be published in the Federal Register and
any private individual could comment on such proposed rules. Through the
involvement of the IJC and the Canadian government, the flaws in the EPA
rulemaking process can be alleviated.
B. Congress Should Delegate Future Rulemaking Authority to the IJC
The procedural protection proposed in the preceding section would
further the goal of a binational ecosystem approach to the Great Lakes.
Nevertheless, there is a better organization in which to conduct rulemaking
pursuant to the 1978 GLWQA. Under the current procedure, only the
Environmental Protection Agency is involved. The EPA could remedy this
situation by implementing this Note's recommendation. However, the result
would involve three separate organizations attempting to work together to
promulgate a -rule, which would lead to an inefficient decision-making
process. This inefficiency can be avoided by having Congress delegate
rulemaking authority to the IJC.

160. Id. § 3(2).
161. See Public Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1988).
162. Id. at 453.
163. Id. at 455-67. Note, however, three justices in PublicCitizen found that advisory committees
could arise as a result of continual advisement. Id. at 477. There remains doubt today as to whether
FACA applies to advisory committees that were not established by the agency itself. See Michael H.
Cardozo, The FederalAdvisory Committee in Operation, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 28 (1981).
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Canada and the United States requested the first study of the Great
Lakes in 19 12 164 At that time, the IJC was not a scientific expert on
Great Lakes issues. However, through the years the IJC gained the
experience and background necessary to promulgate rules concerning the
Great Lakes.
The 1972 GLWQA developed the WQB and the Research Advisory
Board (later the Science Advisory Board). These Boards published
numerous reports and conducted several studies concerning the Great Lakes.
The IJC has been studying the Great Lakes since 1912, and its two boards
have been conducting studies since 1972. Consequently, the organization
has developed scientific expertise and has acquired experience in dealing
with Great Lakes Management.
The IJC is a unique organization comprising delegates from both the
United States and Canada. These members function together as a single
body seeking common solutions to the management of the Great Lakes
ecosystem. They are expected to set aside political boundaries and work
together to establish the best management strategy for the Great Lakes.
For this reason, this Note proposes that the U.S. Congress delegate
future rulemaking, pursuant to the 1978 GLWQA, to the IJC. The IJC has
authority under the 1978 GLWQA to assist in the implementation of the
Agreement. 165 Similarly, the IJC has the responsibility of:
[t]endering of advise [sic] and recommendations to the Parties and
to the State and Provincial Governments on problems of and matters
related to the quality of the boundary waters of the Great Lakes
System including specific recommendationsconcerning the General
and Specific Objectives, legislation, standards and other
requirements, programs and other measures, and intergovernmental
166
agreements relating to the quality of these waters.
Compatible with the explicit authority granted to the IJC, the United States
could request that the IJC prepare a Reference concerning the "specific
objectives, legislation, and standards" necessary to implement the 1978

164. The issue of Great Lakes pollution was referred to the IJC in 1912. The final report was
issued in 1918. The IJC found that the connecting channels and rivers were foul, unsightly, and polluted.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 25, at 20.
165. Revised 1978 GLWQA, supra note 76, art. VII, at 15.
166. Id. art. VII, § I(c), at 15 (emphasis added).
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GLWQA in the United States. Congress, by amending the Clean Water Act,
has the power to delegate authority to the IJC to prepare a Reference.
Consequently, this reference would become binding U.S. law upon
completion.
The three basic problems that result from the EPA procedure would be
avoided. First, since the IJC is the leading expert on the Great Lakes, and
since it is the IJC's responsibility to "assist" in the implementation of the
Agreement, it is more likely to assure that the regulations are consistent with
the 1978 GLWQA, as amended by the 1987 Protocol.
Second, the lack of binational representation would be rectified. The
IJC is composed of members from both Canada and the United States
working together to execute the obligations of the GLWQA. Having
members from both governments will facilitate cooperation and ensure that
all concerns surrounding Great Lakes management are considered.
Finally, regulations that follow the ecosystem mandate of the 1978
GLWQA will only be produced when the ecosystem as a whole is
considered. The IJC, as a binational organization, will not be hindered by
the apparent differences in management strategies between the countries.
It can successfully develop regulations that are best for the entire ecosystem
and not just a single country.
The IJC is well equipped to operate a rule-making process. Pursuant to
the GLWQA, the IJC has various explicit powers:
In the discharge of its responsibilities under this Reference, the
Commission may exercise all of the powers conferred upon it by the
Boundary Waters Treaty and by any legislation passed pursuant
thereto including the power to conduct public hearings and to
compel the testimony of witnesses and the production of
documents. 67
'
The IJC has proved in the past that it is successfully able to involve the
public in its decision-making process.'6" After the IJC receives a request
for a Reference, notice of the investigation is published, often by notifying
the media and interested private groups. 6 9 A preliminary hearing is often

167. Id. art. VII, § 2, at 15.
168. See generally Mimi Larsen Becker, The International Joint Commission and Public
Participation:Past Experiences,Present Challenges. Future Tasks, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 235 (1993).
169. William R. Willoughby, Expectations and Experience 1909-1979, in THE INTERNATIONAL
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held in order to acquire information and to inform the public on the
investigation. 7 0
The IJC's boards, the SAB and the WQB, prepare reports and proposals
that are submitted to the IJC Commissioners. 7' In order to prepare these
reports, the boards open their meetings to the news media and hold public
hearings.'7 2 After the Board has produced a report, it is submitted to the
IJC, which publishes and distributes it to interested persons and
1 74
Thereafter, the IJC then holds public hearings.
organizations.' 73
These hearings are often very informal and are intended to allow interested
persons an opportunity to express their views or opinions as to a finding by
175
the Board.
This procedure used by the IJC sufficiently protects the interests of all
the parties involved. The IJC would not be required to follow the
procedures set forth in the APA. Section 553 of the APA applies "except
to the extent that there is involved a military or foreign affairs function of
the United States."' 76 Since the IJC would be performing a function
concerning foreign affairs, it would be excluded from the procedures of the
APA. 177 One reason for such an exception is that an agency working on
the international level might be forced to follow two sets of procedures in
order to involve the proper people. 78 In the current situation, the IJC
must involve representatives from both the United States and Canada.
Therefore, the APA exception was included to allow the formulation of
unique procedures in order to accommodate both countries.
In addition, this exception is especially necessary "in the international
area where Department regulations are developed by negotiation with
foreign . . . authorities and are not subject to unilateral variation by the
Department."' 79 Thus, it would appear that the IJC would fall under the

JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON 24, 36 (Robert Spencer et al. eds., 1981).
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 36-37.
176. Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
177. Also, Congress could create an explicit exception to the APA when it delegates rulemaking
authority to the IJC.
178. Arthur Earl Bonfield, Military and ForeignAffairs Function Rule-Making Under the APA,
71 MIcH. L. REV. 221, 274 (1972).
179. Id. (quoting the opinion of the U.S. Post Office).
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exception to APA rulemaking. The procedures required by the Canadian
government must be considered along with those of the United States.
Therefore, to best enable the IJC to accommodate the needs of both
countries, it is likely that the IJC will not be required to follow the strict
requirements of the APA.
However, this is not to suggest that the IJC abandon all rule-making
procedures. In order to maintain its credibility and to maintain a forum of
neutrality, it will be necessary to involve interested parties from both sides
of the border. As exemplified from past references, the IJC is well suited
to do so. The result of the APA exception allows the IJC to formulate the
rule-making procedures that best accommodate the unique international rulemaking situation.
This proposal will raise paramount concerns in the United States
regarding the rule-making authority of a Commission whose membership
includes Canadian citizens. Specifically, two serious constitutional problems
could arise over the delegation of rule-making authority to the IJC.
The first U.S. constitutional issue pertains to the Appointments
Clause.'
The Appointments Clause states that the President shall have
the power to appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, all Officers
of the United States.18 1 However, Congress may choose to vest the
Appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the Courts, or the
82
head of departments.1
In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the function of
the Appointments Clause. 183 The Court determined that the term "officers
of the United States" means "any appointee exercising significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States.' 84 Similarly, a Ninth Circuit
case held that, for the purposes of the Appointments Clause, a council
created by an interstate compact was acting pursuant to the compact, and not
pursuant to the laws of the United States.8 5 Thus, the members were not
officers of the United States.

180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
184. Id. at 125-26.
185. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conservation Planning Council,
786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
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Likewise, in the context of international law, the Appointments Clause
has caused concern. Chapter 19 of the Free Trade Agreement created a
binational panel to resolve disputes.'8 6 This panel is composed of five
individuals: two from the United States, two from Canada, and the one
87
chosen from a list of citizens from both Canada and the United States.
This delegation of U.S. governmental authority to a binational panel has
caused many commentators to challenge the constitutionality of such a
delegation.' 88 These commentators argue that the panel members do
essentially the same job as administrative officers or judicial officers.' 89
Additionally, the substantive law being applied is U.S. law and not
international law. 9 ° Therefore, they must be appointed pursuant to the
Constitution.
Conversely, many commentators, including some in the federal
government, argue that the binational panel is constitutional. The panel
members are created and are exercising authority pursuant to an international
agreement.'' Therefore, they are not operating pursuant to laws of the
United States.
In the current situation, the IJC is a binational commission operating
pursuant to the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty and the 1978 GLWQA.
Three members of the Commission are appointed by the President and three
members are appointed by the Canadian government.'92
Their
responsibility would be to promulgate regulations consistent with their
reference power under that Agreement. Because the IJC would be operating
pursuant to international law, and not federal law, it is unlikely that
delegating rulemaking authority to the IJC would violate the Appointments
Clause.
The second potential constitutional violation would be an infraction of
the Delegation Doctrine. Two basic theories exist regarding the Delegation
Doctrine. First, the Constitution states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein

186.
187.

Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., Ch. 19, 27 I.L.M. 293, 386.
William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settlements

Mechanisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1315, 1316 (1992).

188. See generally Alan B. Morrison, Appointments Clause Problems in the Dispute Resolution
Provisions of the United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1299 (1992).
189. Id. at 1302.
190. Id. at 1303.
191. H.R. REP. No. 816, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 (1988).
192. Even assuming that the Commissioners can be correctly labeled as "inferior officers," the
Canadian representatives were not appointed in conformance with the Appointments Clause.
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granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."' 93 In Carter
v. Carter Coal, the Supreme Court held that the power to regulate an
industry cannot be delegated to a private group, because the authority to
Thus, any legislative
regulate is "necessarily a governmental function."'
action must be taken by the legislature.
The second theory behind the Delegation Doctrine arises from a notion
of Due Process. The delegation issue first arose over concerns deriving
from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 5
The distinctions between a deprivation of due process or equal
protection and an unlawful delegation of legislative power are often
obscure. Thus it is not surprising that the Court in Carter held that
the . . .Act

. .

. contained an improper delegation of legislative

power, and as such deprived petitioners of "rights safeguarded by
the due process clause of the 5th Amendment." 96
The Court in Carter Coal seems to stress the fact that "[t]he power
conferred upon the majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of
an unwilling minority. This is legislative delegation in its most obnoxious
form. .. .'"' The Court was concerned with private interests that were
not only unrepresented, but which were adverse to those who did participate
in the rulemaking.' 9
"[R]egardless of its doctrinal basis, the Court has almost always upheld
delegation of power."' 99 In Currin v. Wallace, private tobacco growers
were given the power to veto agency action by the Secretary of
Agriculture. 2°° Additionally, in United States v. Rock Royal Coop, private
milk producers were given the right to veto agency action.20 ' In both
situations, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the delegation of power to private
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194.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).

195.

George N. Liebmann, Delegation to Private Parties inAmerican Constitutional Law, 50 IND.

L.J. 650, 665 (1975).
196. Id. at 654 n.16.
197. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311.
198. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J
(1982).

. 108 n.580

199. Harold 1. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their
Constitutionality, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 190 (1989).
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Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. I (1939).
United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
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parties. "The private actors in these cases were given the°2 authority to make
2
a governmental decision jointly with a public officer.1
Courts have had little difficulty in upholding statutes that delegate
rulemaking authority to boards made up of members of an industry.2 3
Furthermore, the Federal Open Market Committee, composed of a
combination of public and private officials, was upheld as a valid delegation
of authority.20 4
A list of factors has been developed to determine whether there has been
an impermissible delegation of rulemaking authority:
(1)Does the statute confer upon private delegates the power not
only to make rules but to apply the law to particular individuals?
(2) Are the actions of private delegates subject to no further public
or judicial review?
(3) Are the private delegates chosen by a process involving public
consent, as by nomination or confirmation by elected officials?
(4) Are the private delegates sworn to oaths of office?
have pecuniary interest in the
(5) Do the private delegates
205
determinations to be made?
The IJC is made up of three members appointed by the President and
three members appointed by the Canadian government. The three Canadian
delegates are analogous to private parties who have received a delegation of
rulemaking authority. The Commission therefore operates as a joint
commission made up of private and public members. On its face, it appears
similar to the Federal Open Market Committee, which was upheld as a
24
permissible delegation of rulemaking authority.
Additionally, the IJC would have no problem passing scrutiny of factors
necessary for permissible delegation. First, the IJC has no enforcement
powers. Second, the rules promulgated by the IJC would be subject to
judicial review in federal court. Third, half of the members are appointed
by the President of the United States, and half are appointed by the
202. Abramson, supra note 199, at 193.
203. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940); Floyd v. Thornton, 68
S.E.2d 334 (S.C. 1951); Fleisher v. Duncan, 24 S.E.2d 15 (Ga. 1943); Spiers v. Magnolia Petroleum, 244
P.2d 843 (Okla. 1951).
204. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. 510, 522-24 (D.D.C. 1986), aff'd
on other grounds, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988).
205. Liebmann, supra note 195, at 717-18.
206. See Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 644 F. Supp. at 522-24.
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Canadian government. In both cases, they are appointed by elected officials
of the respective countries. Fourth, it is the responsibility of the IJC to
assist in the implementation of the GLWQA. Finally, the members of the
IJC have no pecuniary interest in the outcome of the rulemaking. They are
all working together for the benefit of the entire ecosystem.
Even if the delegation was found to be an impermissible delegation of
rule-making authority, an argument similar to the one in the Appointments
Clause can be made. Since the IJC is created by international law, and is
operating pursuant to the 1978 GLWQA, then it rises above the domestic
sphere and into an international analysis. "[T]he Supreme Court has
traditionally been less concerned with separation of power issues" when
there is an international forum. 7
The method of appointment provides sufficient safeguards to protect the
citizens of both countries against arbitrary decisionmaking on behalf of the
IJC. The IJC is a binational committee, and the members are appointed by
the respective countries' elected officials. The entire ecosystem is
represented by the IJC, whose members have been appointed by
representatives accountable to their respective countries. The method used
to appoint Commissioners reinforces representative democracy on an
international scale.
It therefore appears that the IJC is not only the most appropriate forum
for international rulemaking, but also that it overcomes any constitutional
challenges that may come its way. Thus, in order to increase the efficiency
of the process and to facilitate binational decisionmaking, the U.S. Congress
should delegate rule-making authority to the International Joint Commission.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement is one of the "most radical
and comprehensive experiments in ecosystem management yet articulated for
transboundary water resource management."2 8 However, the United
States has been relaxed in the implementation of this Agreement. The Great
Lakes Water Quality Initiative is the first real attempt by the U.S.
government to implement the Agreement. Notably, the rule-making process
exemplifies the United States' history of rulemaking "protectionism."
207.
208.
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Neither the International Joint Commission nor the Canadian government

was involved in the decisionmaking.
As a result of this defect, three problems arose in the promulgation
process: (1) the Proposed Rules do not meet the requirements specified in
the 1978 GLWQA; (2) the binational strategy of cooperation articulated in
the 1978 GLWQA was not utilized; and (3) the EPA failed to manage the
Great Lakes as an ecosystem.
In order to correct these defects, the EPA must include both the IJC and
the Canadian government in decisionmaking. A Commissioner of the IJC
could be appointed as a voting member of the Steering Committee.
Additionally, the SAB could be represented with a seat on the Technical
Committee. These members would serve as ombudsmen for the Great
Lakes. Next, the EPA must consult with its Canadian counterpart agency
in order to assure conformity and cooperation.
However, this process could lead to inefficiencies. Three separate
organizations would be involved in the decisionmaking, thus making an
impractical and wasteful process. As a result, the better approach would be
to vest rule-making authority solely in the IJC.
Delegation of rule-making authority to the IJC will emphasize the
commitment of the United States to the implementation of the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement. This will be the first true attempt at binational
cooperation between the United States and Canada in the implementation of
an ecosystem approach to the Great Lakes Basin. This type of rulemaking
has the potential to alleviate the piecemeal rulemaking that has occurred
between the two countries. The United States needs to demonstrate its
commitment to the goals of the Agreement by delegating rule-making
authority to the IJC. This would put extreme pressure on the Canadian
government to do the same. True internationalrulemaking is the only
avenue through which a binational resource can be properly managed.

